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Abstract
Poor local information networks and weak social sanctions in urban
settings make joint liability unable to guarantee high repayment rates to
microlenders. Yet, microcredit programmes in Western Europe report
good performance even if the majority of them charge no collateral. We
collect data from three Italian microcredit institutions which operate in
urban areas by granting individual loans without collateral to single en-
trepreneurs and teams (cooperatives and associations) and we ﬁnd that
teams repay with higher probability. On this basis we develop a microlend-
ing instrument that, like joint liability implemented in rural economies,
extracts information from borrowers through a peer selection mechanism
but, diﬀerently from joint liability, ﬁts the urban context for it reproduces
a cohesion among entrepreneurs based on a proﬁt-maximizing behavior
and not on social sanctions.
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11 Introduction
Microcredit programmes provide ﬁnancial services to small-scale entrepreneurs
who otherwise lack access to capital markets because not endowed with assets
to be pledged as collateral.
Empirical evidence shows that these unconventional lenders have a reason-
able degree of ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency even if they target poor people who
would not be welcomed as customers by ordinary commercial bank. One of
the reasons for this success is the application of joint liability: when informa-
tional asymmetry between lenders and entrepreneurs is more severe than among
entrepreneurs themselves, this scheme of lending is able to mitigate adverse se-
lection problems, inter alia, without requesting any pecuniary collateral (for
exhaustive surveys see, e.g., Ghatak and Guinnane [6]; and Fedele [5]). Joint
liability works as follows: entrepreneurs, who diﬀer in their ability of repayment
and work on distinct projects, self-select into groups to get a loan. If the group
does not fully repay its obligations, then the microlender cut oﬀ all members
from future credit until the debt is repaid, so that the successful entrepreneurs
are induced to help failing partners. If entrepreneurs have perfect information
about each other’s type, then joint liability drives the good ones to choose part-
ners of the same type, while the bad entrepreneurs have no choice but to form
groups with other bad ones: this is called peer selection and enables the mi-
crolender to screen out entrepreneurs. As a result, repayment rates and welfare
rise with respect to lending to individuals when no ex-ante collateral is put up.
This model of lending turns out to be eﬀective in serving clients who belong
to rural communities, where networks of local information are strong and peer
pressure from fellow villagers, like reputation loss of insolvent entrepreneurs or
restriction on access to inputs necessary for the business, induces discipline in
repayment.
On the contrary, many experiences show that in urban industrialized areas
joint liability scheme may be a poor ﬁt for potential clients. NEF [13] and
Viganò et al. [14] (henceforth NEF and Viganò) ﬁnd that 79% of the existing
microcredit experiences in Western Europe makes only individual loans, just
4% adopts group lending with joint liability and 17% makes both individual
and group loans. This is motivated by the fact that people who live in cities
are less likely to know each other, so that peer selection may not occur: Laﬀont
and N’Guessan [12] show that repayment rates do not increase with joint liabil-
ity if entrepreneurs ignore the ability of repayment of partners. Furthermore,
social sanctions are less important so that pressure to repay is weaker and joint
liability schemes become inappropriate (Ghatak and Guinnane [6]; Ciravegna
[3]). If microcredit in the poor world ﬁnds its reason to exist in the need to
alleviate poverty, the most important rationales for the spread of microcredit
in the developed world, where tax, legal, welfare, employment and banking
systems are diﬀerent, are to create employment, integrate minority groups and
increase female participation in the workforce; microlending becomes thus a
tool to increase social inclusion, in contrast with the original view of the under-
2developed countries where the main force leading to the successful repayment
of microloans is the strong social network (Anderloni [1]; ILO [9]).
Interestingly, the institutions surveyed by NEF and Viganò declare a high
average repayment rate of 90.3%, even if the majority of them charges neither
joint liability nor collateral.1 Yet, the two reports do not mention whether
alternative lending schemes help to maintain such positive results.2
To get a more detailed picture of features of microcredit programs in urban
settings, we study the case of three microlenders which operate in Northern
Italian cities: MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6 Reggio Emilia. They
target two main categories of entrepreneurs, single entrepreneurs and teams
(cooperatives and associations), and make individual loans without requesting
collateral. We collect data on interest and repayment rates and we ﬁnd that (i)
single entrepreneurs are charged a higher average interest rate and repay less
often than teams, (ii) between teams, cooperatives ensure a higher repayment
rate and pay a lower average interest rate than associations.
With the aim of developing a deeper understanding of how microcredit
contractual instruments should be designed to ﬁt urban contexts, we construct
the following theoretical framework: a microcredit market is considered with
adverse selection à la De Meza and Webb [4] and Laﬀont and N’Guessan [12].
Two types of entrepreneurs are present who need funding to implement risky
projects and diﬀer in their ability to produce output. Before applying for loans,
entrepreneurs decides simultaneously whether (1) to perform individually the
project, or (2) to constitute production teams, whose size is exogenously ﬁxed
by the ﬁnancial agreement. The entrepreneurs know only their own type: they
live in cities where people do not know each other. Yet, they are supposed
to have raised costless perfect information about others’ type when building a
team: people participating in a common project and focused on its success are
induced to look for potential partners whose reliability they already know. We
think, for instance, of friends or colleagues.
Loans are granted by a microlender who requires no collateral, knows the
fractions of good and bad entrepreneurs in the population, but ignores which
speciﬁc entrepreneur is of which type. Loans consist of diﬀerent lending schemes,
that the microlender commits to implementing conditional on and before the
1See Kugler and Oppes [11] for a discussion of the ability of collateral to mitigate informa-
tional problems in urban microcredit programmes with joint liability, where social sanctions
are too weak to serve the role of collateral substitutes.
2Armendáriz and Morduch [2] list a number of innovations in the microlending practice
that go beyond joint liability and help to maintain high repayment rates also in places with
scarce local information: among such innovations, progressive lending, which is adopted by
around 50% of the institutions surveyed by NEF and Viganò, consists of granting an initial
small amount of money, whose size increases successively only if the borrower demonstrates
reliability (see also Giné et al. [7] for an experimental analysis). The scheme enables microlen-
ders to screen out the worst clients before taking additional risk by expanding loan scale, but
presents at least a disadvantage: when there is a multiplicity of microlenders, borrowers who
default on a loan can turn to another ﬁnancial provider if there is poor information on credit
histories, so that threats to not be reﬁnanced lose vigor.
3entrepreneurs’ choice between alternatives (1) or (2).3
If all entrepreneurs choose to perform singularly the project, the microlen-
der grants individual loans: this mechanism is designated as Individual Lending
scheme. If, instead, all entrepreneurs decide to build teams, a screening mecha-
nism, which consists of two contracts and is denominated as Production Team
Lending scheme, is executed. The ﬁrst contract contains a certain repayment
and requires each team to adopt a technology A, for which expected output is
increasing and convex in the number of good members. The second contract
prescribes a higher repayment and the use of a technology B, for which ex-
pected output is (a) linearly increasing in the number of good entrepreneurs,
(b) higher than expected output with technology A when all members are bad
and (c) equal to when all members are good. If members know each other,
convexity of technology A is a suﬃcient condition to have peer selection: teams
arise with either all good or all bad entrepreneurs. On the contrary, proﬁts
depend on the entrepreneur type and not on team composition, when technol-
ogy B is adopted. Good entrepreneurs end up by selecting the ﬁrst contract
for the associated repayment is lower; bad entrepreneurs, who fail more often
if they employ technology A, prefer the second contract even if it entails a
higher repayment. This enables the microlender to screen between good and
bad entrepreneurs and overcome the informational problem.
When, ﬁnally, some entrepreneurs choose to form teams and others to per-
form individually the project, lending mechanism is called Mixed Lending and
consists of a diﬀerent pair of contracts. The ﬁrst one is addressed to teams: it
contains a repayment, requires the teams to adopt a technology which consists
of a linear combination of technologies A and B and is denominated mixed
technology. The second contract is designed to suit single entrepreneurs and
speciﬁes a higher repayment due by them only if successful. Again peer selection
occurs when the mixed technology is utilized. Good entrepreneurs select the
ﬁrst contract for the associated repayment is lower, while bad entrepreneurs,
who fail more often if they form teams, prefer the second contract even if it
entails a higher repayment.
We solve the static Bayesian game played by the entrepreneurs when they
choose between alternatives (1) or (2) and we ﬁnd that two scenarios arise at
equilibrium: (i) all good entrepreneurs choose to constitute teams by adopting
mixed technology, while all bad ones stay alone and repay with lower probabil-
ity; (ii) all good entrepreneurs form teams among them by choosing technology
A, whereas bad ones build teams with peers by selecting technology B and
repay with lower probability.
Our results suggest that targeting teams with high degree of complemen-
tarity among tasks may represent a good microlending strategy in urban areas
where no collateral is put up and social capital is weak. Indeed, when building
production teams entrepreneurs participate in a common project and are fo-
cused on its success, thereby being likely to gather information about potential
3Throughout the paper, we refer to the microlender as “he” and to each entrepreneur as
“she”.
4partners’ ability of producing output, as mentioned above, and to reproduce
a cohesion typical of joint liability schemes, but based on a proﬁt-maximizing
behavior and not on social sanctions. The more important the contribution
of (good) members is, as it occurs with technology A, the more eﬀective the
proﬁt-maximizing behavior is in inducing peer selection. For these reasons, our
instrument may represent an useful alternative to joint liability in urban devel-
oped settings, where networks of local information are highly fragmented and
social ties are weak. Moreover, the problem of competition among microlenders
is not related to our scheme, since it does not entail threats of future denied
access to credit (see Note 2).
Our model also proposes a possible explanation of the good performance
of teams (and cooperatives) among MAGs’ clients: if one thinks of teams that
adopt technology A as cooperatives, while identifying teams with technology B
as associations, then the pool of cooperatives and associations can be thought
as an example of mixed technology. In this case the ﬁrst equilibrium scenario
describes the situation where teams turn out to be less risky than single en-
trepreneurs and enable the microlender to charge a lower interest rate. Our
model explains this empirical ﬁnding by arguing that teams count only good
entrepreneurs, while single entrepreneurs are bad. Second scenario illustrates
by means of the same reasoning the situation where cooperatives seem to be
better clients than associations.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
further details of NEF and Viganò surveys. In Section 3 we carry out the
MAGs data analysis. The basic model is laid out in Section 4. Sections 5, 6 and
7 present Individual Lending, Production Team Lending and Mixed Lending
schemes, respectively. Section 8 studies the equilibrium and Section 9 concludes.
4The Italian Civil Code helps to meet a possible explanation of our interpretation of coop-
eratives and associations. It deﬁnes as cooperative any organization of people that operates
for a common purpose, where each member has to answer for social obligation in case of
compulsory severance or bankruptcy (in the speciﬁc case of loans received by the MAG, no
pecuniary collateral is required; however, once the activity of the cooperative starts, new ac-
tors who require ﬁnancial guarantees come into the picture, such as suppliers and customers).
Rights and duties of people who constitute associations, on the other hand, are such that less
emphasis is put on both organizational aspects and ﬁnancial obligations. As a consequence,
cooperatives bring more pressure on the members to make them perform well: tasks within
cooperatives display bigger complementarity. On the contrary, single contributions of the
good entrepreneurs within associations are less related to team composition. Furthermore,
cooperatives require generally higher initial ﬁxed organizational costs: this is why we assume,
even if we do not introduce explicit costs, that teams with technology A produce smaller
(gross) expected output than teams with technology B when all members are bad. Such costs
are compensated when the huge complementarity degree among single contributions of good
entrepreneurs with technology A is totally exploited, i.e. when members are all good: in such
a case the same (gross) output is assumed to be produced by both technologies.
52 Microcredit in Western Europe
The development of microcredit in Europe has been quite widespread in the last
decades but with diﬀerent features compared to the original idea of Muhammad
Yunus, based on joint liability.
The literature concerning European industrialised countries is still limited
with two relevant surveys as cornerstones of the existing work, the aforemen-
tioned NEF and Viganò, which help to understand the current state of micro-
credit in Europe: 30 organisations were contacted by NEF and 32 by Viganò,
with an overlapping of 11 that leads to a total of 51 interviews. 59% of the in-
stitutions do not ask collateral for the loan and only 44% provide non-ﬁnancial
support services. Microcredit experiences can be found in many countries in
Western Europe (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Germany,
United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Norway) and, given the contrasting legal
and regulatory environment, they seem to assume diﬀerent institutional forms.
The most common are Cooperatives (31%) and Foundations (25%), followed
by non-bank ﬁnancial institutions (19%), NGOs (9%), associations (9%) and
banks (7%). As mentioned above, 79% of the surveyed organisations make only
individual loans, 4% only group loans and 17% make both individual and group
loans; the greatest coverage and outreach is taking place in France with 52.7%
of the loans made by all the microlenders, followed by Finland with 27.3%;
90% of the microcredit institutions give loans for start-up of entrepreneurial
activities. Some other relevant statistical ﬁndings by NEF and Viganò concern
the ﬁnancial characteristics of the loans: the average loan size around Europe
is 12500C =, with average loans terms of 33 months and interest rates that range
from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 19.5%, with an average of 6.8%. Fi-
nally, repayment rates range from a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 100%,
with average repayment rate of 90.3%.
3 The Italian MAGs: Data Analysis
While reviewing the existing literature on microcredit we became immediately
aware of the lack of a unique and clear deﬁnition of microcredit, especially in
industrialised countries where many institutions tend to call themselves mi-
crolenders every time they lend sums below C = 25000, requiring both pecuniary
and personal collateral. Therefore our ﬁrst step was to choose an unambigu-
ous deﬁnition of microcredit institution as an organization that lends money
to “active poor” for start-up of business activity without asking any pecuniary
collateral and provides support services to allow the entrepreneur to make the
loan fruitful.5
In Italy the institution that better ﬁts our requirements is MAG (Mutua
5Gonzalez-Vega [8] deﬁnes active poor as those people that, even if living in poverty, prove
to be technically skilled to such a degree as to enable them to develop, and autonomously run,
an economic activity, or to at least produce a constant ﬂow of resources which can be used
for repayment of debt or for savings.
6Autogestita), a national entity divided in six regional groups; of these only
three provide loans to business activities: MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and
MAG6 Reggio Emilia. The ﬁrst MAG was created in 1978 in Verona in order
to satisfy the increasing need for new ﬁnancial tools to support projects with a
social implications that would not otherwise get funds in the traditional ﬁnan-
cial markets. MAGs are Cooperatives or, as they prefer to deﬁne themselves,
self-sustainable societies of people that save and use private capital to ﬁnance
fruitful projects. They are therefore authorised by the members to lend money
to other members with favorable interest rates and repayment conditions, pro-
viding support services and without requiring any pecuniary collateral.
The empirical analysis of the data available from the three MAGs is based
on 337 loans for start-up of business activities. We study the diﬀerence between
loans to individuals and to teams both in terms of interest rates and repayment
rates. By September 2005 the three MAGs had provided 277 loans to teams and
60 to individuals; 88.4% of the loan contracts were already expired. This recalls
MAG’s original objective of ﬁnancing organizations with strong participation
of workers and investors in the business activity.
We ﬁrst compute the average values of the interest rate for (i) individuals
and teams, (ii) within the latter, for cooperatives, on one hand, and associations,
on the other. We then deﬁne the repayment rate as follows:
Amount repaid at time t
Amount due at time t
and compute its average values. Tables 1 and 2 below show the outcome of our
analysis on MAGs’ data.
Table 1: MAGs Data Analysis: Teams vs. Singles
9,33% 76,47% 60 Loans to Single Entrepreneurs
8,78% 87,36% 277 Loans to Teams
Interest Rate Repayment Rate Number
Table 2: MAGs Data Analysis: Cooperatives vs. Associations
9,23% 85,79% 112 Loans to Associations
8,48% 88,42% 165 Loans to Cooperatives
Interest Rate Repayment Rate Number
Table 1 suggests that lending to teams is less risky and enables the microlender
7to charge a lower interest rate according to the purpose of promoting employ-
ment and social inclusion through favorable ﬁnancial conditions. Disaggre-
gating the data on teams, we ﬁnd that cooperatives are better clients than
associations. The remainder of the paper develops the theoretical framework.
4 The Model
Consider a microcredit market with N = 4 wealthless risk-neutral entrepreneurs
of two types. Entrepreneurs of type τ = H propose productive projects which
yield A with probability pH = 1. Risky projects of type τ = L entrepreneurs
yield A with probability pL = p, 0 < p < 1, and zero otherwise. Each en-
trepreneur needs one unit of capital to implement the project. Money is pro-
vided by a risk-neutral microlending institution. Throughout the paper we
refer to type H (L) entrepreneurs as good (bad). Opportunity cost of labor is
equal to 0, while ρ > 1 is per unit opportunity cost of capital. The two values
represent reservation proﬁts of entrepreneurs and microlender, respectively.
Before obtaining funding, the entrepreneurs decide whether (1) to perform
singularly the project, or (2) to form production teams. Teams must count
n = 2 members. Two entrepreneurs are type H and the other two are type
L in the population. The entrepreneurs know only their own type. Yet, they
are supposed to have raised costless and perfect information about others’ type
when building a team. On the contrary, the microlender knows that half en-
trepreneurs are type H and the other half are type L, but ignores which speciﬁc
entrepreneur is of which type: there is informational asymmetry.
In case (1), as speciﬁed above, each entrepreneur needs one unit of capital as
input: if the entrepreneur is good, output is equal to A; if she is bad, expected
output is pA. In case (2) each team needs two units of capital as input and
expected output depends not only on the entrepreneurs’ type, but also on the
technology they decide to avail themselves of, as we will see below.
Before the entrepreneurs’ choice between (1) and (2), the microlender an-
nounces that he will execute diﬀerent lending schemes conditional on such a
choice. Three situations may arise: all entrepreneurs perform singularly the
project, in which case the microlender implements individual loans, that we
refer to as Individual Lending scheme (henceforth IL); all entrepreneurs consti-
tute teams, then the microlender executes a pair of screening contracts, which is
denominated as Production Team Lending scheme (henceforth PTL); ﬁnally,
two entrepreneurs build a team and the other two perform individually the
project, in which case the scheme consists in a diﬀerent pair of screening con-
tracts and is called Mixed Lending Scheme (henceforth ML). Detailed features
of the three ﬁnancial mechanisms are delineated in Sections 5, 6 and 7.
4.1 Timing and Game
Timing of the model is as follows.
81. At t = 0, Nature draws a type vector ς from the set (ς1, ς2, ς3, ς4, ς5, ς6),
where ς1 = (H, H, L, L), ς2 = (H, L, H, L), ς3 = (H, L, L, H), ς4 =
(L, H, H, L), ς5 = (L, H, L, H) and ς6 = (L, L, H, H), according to
prior probability distribution Π(ς) which assigns probability 1/6 to the
draw of every vector.
2. At t = 1, Nature reveals τi, τ = H, L, to entrepreneur i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
but not to any other entrepreneur nor to the microlender.
3. At t = 2, the microlender proposes the above triple of lending schemes.
4. At t = 3, the entrepreneurs, after observing the menu of contracts, decide
simultaneously whether to perform individually the project or to consti-
tute production teams.
5. At t = 4 the single entrepreneurs and/or the teams, who have no time
preference, decide whether to accept one of the proposed lending schemes,
in which case they obtain funds and invest, or not to apply.
6. At t = 5, output is produced: the single entrepreneurs and/or the teams
repay according to the contractual scheme they accept at t = 4.
We analyze the simultaneous Bayesian game among entrepreneurs at t = 3
by restricting our attention to pure-strategy Bayesian Equilibria (BE). Each
entrepreneur selects an action from the set AE = {S,T}, where S indicates the
choice of performing singularly the project and T the choice of building a team.
When choosing S a player knows only her type and her interim beliefs about the
type of any other player are computed using Bayes’ rule: πi (τ−i = τi |τi) = 1/3
and πi (τ−i  = τi |τi) = 2/3. When choosing T, instead, she knows perfectly the
others’ type. Prior beliefs of the microlender about the entrepreneurs’ type also
derive from Bayes’ rule: πm (H) = πm (L) = 1/2, where subscript m stands for
microlender.
There are 2N = 24 possible combinations of actions. We design game’s
outcomes as follows.
If at least three entrepreneurs play S, the outcome of game is assumed to
be “all entrepreneurs stay alone”. Indeed, if at most one player decides to
form a team, she is not able to ﬁnd a partner, thereby being forced to perform
individually her project. In this case, the microlender implements IL.
If, instead, none plays S, then the outcome of game is “two teams are built”
and the microlender executes PTL.
If, ﬁnally, one or two players select S, then the outcome of game is “one
team is built and two entrepreneurs stay alone”, in which case the microlender
fulﬁlls ML.
5 Individual Lending
We begin the analysis of lending schemes from the case where at t = 3 three
or four entrepreneurs choose to perform individually the project, hence IL will
9be implemented by the microlender. Since the entrepreneurs are not endowed
with assets to be put up as collateral, the microlender proposes a ﬁnancial
contract in which the following limited liability constraint is speciﬁed: when
the project succeeds the entrepreneurs have to repay an amount Rτ, τ = H,L,
that cannot exceed the realized returns, whereas if returns are zero nothing is
repaid. Without loss of generality we can design IL as follows. The microlender
chooses Rτ so as to maximize total proﬁts of the entrepreneurs for he represents
a not-for-proﬁt organization, provided that his participation constraint and




2(A − RH) + 2p(A − RL) (1)
s.t.
2RH + 2pRL ≥ 4ρ,
Rτ ≤ A,
A − RH ≥ A − RL, (ICH)
p(A − RL) ≥ p(A − RH), (ICL)
where ICH(L) is the incentive compatibility constraint of type H (L). Solution
to the above program is pooling:




where pM = (1 + p)/2 is the average probability of repaying, computed by
taking into account microlender’s prior beliefs, which he is not able to update:
πm (H) = πm (L) = 1/2. If this contract is accepted, type H entrepreneurs end
up with




and type L with







The microlender gets his reservation value:
(2 + 2p)R∗ = 4ρ. (5)
Bad borrowers, who repay with probability p, are charged a lower inter-
est rate than the one they would pay with symmetric information, as good
borrowers produce an eﬀect of cross-subsidization.
6Remark that entrepreneurs’ participation is implied by limited liability.
106 Production Team Lending
Consider now the case where at t = 3 all entrepreneurs decide to build teams.
As anticipated above, the microlender implements PTL, which consists of a
pair of screening contracts.
The ﬁrst contract requires the teams to adopt a technology for which ex-
pected output of a team with nH type H entrepreneurs plus nL = 2−nH type
L ones is
q(nH,nL)2A + (1 − q(nH,nL))0. (6)
Let the probability of success 0 < q(nH,nL) ≤ 1 be increasing in nH (and




the probability of success q(nH,nL) is increasing and convex in nH. We refer
to this technology as technology A (henceforth AT). The ﬁrst contract also
speciﬁes limited liability and a repayment 2RAT ≤ 2A due by the team as a
whole only in the case of success. We denote this contract with {AT,2RAT}.
An appropriate example of AT is the O-ring technology (Kremer, 1993), where
whole team fails if at least one member fails, i.e. q(nH,nL) = 1nHqnL = q2−nH.
The second contract prescribes the use of a technology which produces the
following expected output:
r(nH,nL)2A + (1 − r(nH,nL))0, (8)
where, again, 0 < r(nH,nL) ≤ 1 is increasing in nH (and decreasing in nL =
2 − nH) and r(2,0) = 1. Furthermore, let





expected output is lower with AT if both members are bad and the probability
of success r(nH,nL) is linearly increasing in nH. This technology is denoted
with B (henceforth BT). The second contract also speciﬁes limited liability
and a repayment 2RBT ≤ 2A due by the team as a whole only in the case of
success. We indicate this contract with {BT,2RBT}.
Assumption 1 r(0,2) = p.
The only example of BT which satisﬁes all the above requirements is a tech-
nology where the probability of success is equal to the mean probability, i.e.
r(nH,nL) = (nH + pnL)/2.
When all entrepreneurs choose to constitute teams, the deriving self-selection
process is driven by PTL: we study its outcome in the next subsection.
116.1 Team formation and Peer Selection
We verify that entrepreneurs choose partners of the same type when contract
{AT,2RAT} is chosen (this is called peer selection), while team formation may
display diﬀerent characteristics when contract {BT,2RBT} is selected.
Recalling expression (6) and the fact that repayment 2RAT is due only in
the case of success, we can write the expected proﬁt of a team which chooses
contract {AT,2RAT} and counts nH type H entrepreneurs plus nL = 2 − nH
type L ones:
q(nH,nL)2(A − RAT). (11)
By assumption q(2,0) is equal to 1, so that (11) is maximum when nH = 2 and
nL = 0: this means that types H are preferred for they increase the probability
of success. It follows that type H entrepreneurs will build teams among them,
while bad entrepreneurs will try to attract preferred types H.
We check whether an equilibrium where teams consist of either all good or
all bad entrepreneurs is robust to bilateral deviations, where (i) a type L tries
to take the place of a type H by making transfers to her, which must at least
equalize loss of the good entrepreneur from joining a team with a bad mate,
(ii) the other two entrepreneurs (i.e. type H and type L who do not change
team) are not allowed to make transfers.7 We suppose each entrepreneur, when
forming a team, is entitled to an amount 1/2 of total output.
If a type L takes the place of a type H in a team made of all good en-
trepreneurs, her gain is given by the diﬀerence between bad entrepreneur’s
expected proﬁt when she teams up with a good mate, i.e.
1
2
q(1,1)2(A − RAT), (12)
and the corresponding value when the mate is bad, i.e.
1
2
q(0,2)2(A − RAT): (13)
we get
[q(1,1) − q(0,2)](A − RAT), (14)
where q(1,1)−q(0,2) is the increased probability of success. Similarly, we can
compute the loss of a good entrepreneur from joining the team with the type
L:
[1 − q(1,1)](A − RAT), (15)
where 1 − q(1,1) is the decreased probability of success. Note that condition
(7) implies
q(1,1) − q(0,2) < 1 − q(1,1), (16)
7Such transfers are not monetary because entrepreneurs are wealthless. They rather con-
sist, for example, of providing free labor services.
12which is equivalent to state that (14) < (15). It follows that a type L en-
trepreneur cannot compensate a good one with a side transfer to take her place
in a team of all good entrepreneurs and simultaneously end up with a positive
return. This condition is suﬃcient to conclude that teams arise with either all
good or all bad entrepreneurs if contract {AT,2RAT} is proposed and accepted.
The former ends up with A − RAT, whereas the latter gets q(0,2)(A − RAT).
The intuition of this result is as follows: good entrepreneurs value good mates
more than bad entrepreneurs because marginal contribution of a type H to the
success probability is increasing in the number of good entrepreneurs already
present in the team but decreasing in the number of bad mates.8
When contract {BT,2RBT} is selected, peer selection in team formation
may not occur. Following the above reasoning, we compute gain of a bad
entrepreneur from leaving a team with a peer and joining a team with a mate
of the other type and loss of a good entrepreneur from following the opposite
path. The former value is
[r(1,1) − r(0,2)](A − RBT). (17)
Similarly, loss of a good entrepreneur from joining a bad partner is
[1 − r(1,1)](A − RBT), (18)
BT satisﬁes condition (10) which implies
r(1,1) − r(0,2) = 1 − r(1,1). (19)
This is equivalent to state that (17) = (18): in this case a type L entrepreneur
can compensate a good one with a side transfer to take her place in the team
with a type H mate and simultaneously end up with a nonnegative return.9
With BT good entrepreneurs do not value good mates more than bad en-
trepreneurs because marginal contribution of a type H to the success proba-
bility does not depend on the team composition. It turns out that, if (17) is
transferred from the type L to the type H, both entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent
between matching with a peer or shifting their respective places. We suppose
that peer selection occurs, in which case both types H end up with A − RBT
and both types L with r(0,2)(A − RBT) = p(A − RBT).
8Peer selection arises even when entrepreneurs who do not switch team are able to make
transfers among them. In such a case inequality (14) < (15) rewrites simply as
2[p(1,1) − p(0,2)](A − RAT) < 2(1 − p(1,1))(A − RAT), (a)
where: the LHS is the sum of gain of the type L who joins a good entrepreneur and gain
of the other type L who does not change team but welcomes a good mate; the RHS is the
corresponding sum of loss of type H who switches team and loss of the other type H who
saddle herself with a bad partner. It is immediate to check that inequality (a) still holds under
condition (7).
9As shown in Note 6, one can verify that this result extends to the case where also en-
trepreneurs who do not switch team are allowed to make transfers.
136.2 Screening Contracts with Production Team Lending
We show how the microlender is able, by means of PTL, to screen between
good and bad entrepreneurs.
The microlender foresees that the expected proﬁt of good entrepreneurs is
(A − RAT) if they accept {AT,2RAT} and (A − RBT) if they accept {BT,2RBT}.
If the following condition holds
A − RAT ≥ A − RBT, (20)
the microlender anticipates correctly that both good entrepreneurs will select
the contract {AT,2RAT}, thereby matching among them, and that bad en-
trepreneurs will have no choice but to constitute a team with a peer. Bad
entrepreneurs will therefore accept contract {BT,2RBT} when
p(A − RBT) ≥ q(0,2)(A − RAT), (21)
where the two sides of the above inequality represent the expected proﬁts of bad
entrepreneurs if they accept either {BT,2RBT} or {AT,2RAT}, respectively.10
The expression below summarizes the incentive compatibility constraints (20)
and (21):
RAT ≤ RBT ≤
[(p − q(0,2))]A + q(0,2)RAT
p
. (22)
Condition (9), Assumption 1 and the limited liability constraint imply that the
above interval is nonempty.
With no loss of generality, the PTL can be summarized as follows: the
microlender sets RBT to maximize proﬁts of bad entrepreneurs on contract
{BT,2RBT}, subject to his participation constraint, to zero-proﬁt condition on
contract {AT,2RAT}, to limited liability and, ﬁnally, to (22). In symbols
max
RBT





RAT ≤ RBT ≤
[p − q(0,2)]A + q(0,2)RAT
p
,
where j = AT, BT. Taking into account that zero-proﬁt condition on contract
10If the choice of technology is observed after the contract is signed, then the inequality
(21) can be rewritten as p(A − RBT) ≥ p(A − RAT)−F, where F could be a ﬁne charged to
the bad entrepreneurs when they adopt technology B after selecting contract {AT,2RAT}.
14{AT,2RAT} gives R∗
AT = ρ, (23) can be rewritten as
max
RBT

















ρ ≤ A, (25)
the solution to (24) is R∗
BT =
ρ
p. Good entrepreneurs end up with
A − R∗
AT = A − ρ (26)
and bad ones with
p(A − R∗
BT) = pA − ρ. (27)
The microlender obtains his reservation proﬁt:
2R∗
AT + 2pR∗
BT = 4ρ. (28)
The entrepreneurs self-select among peers if AT is adopted. This enables
the microlender to screen between good and bad clients if he implements PTL.
Indeed, good entrepreneurs succeed with certainty under both technologies,
thereby choosing contract {AT,2RAT} because R∗
AT < R∗
BT. Instead, bad
entrepreneurs prefer BT even if the associated repayment is higher, because
q(0,2)(A − R∗
AT) ≤ p(A − R∗
BT): (29)
they fail more often with AT.11
7 Mixed Lending
Suppose now that at t = 3 one or two entrepreneurs select S: the outcome
of game is then “one team is built and two entrepreneurs stay alone” and the
microlender fulﬁlls ML, which consists of a pair of contracts. The ﬁrst one is
addressed to the team and requires it to adopt a technology for which expected
output of a team with nH type H entrepreneurs plus nL = 2−nH type L ones
is
s(nH,nL)2A, (30)
11It is easy to check that PTL produces screening even when peer selection does not occur
with BT.
15where
s(nH,nL) = αq(nH,nL) + (1 − α)r(nH,nL) and α ∈ (0,1). (31)
This technology consists of a linear combination of AT and BT and is de-
nominated mixed technology (MT). The contract also contains a repayment
2RMT ≤ 2A due by the team as a whole only in the case of success. We indicate
this contract with {MT,2RMT}. The second contract, {R1}, is designed to suit
the single entrepreneurs and speciﬁes a repayment R1 ≤ A due by them only
whether successful.
Conditions (7), (10) and deﬁnition (31) are suﬃcient to have peer selection
when contract {MT,2RMT} is selected. It follows that type H entrepreneurs
end up with (A − RMT), when selecting {MT,2RMT}, and with (A − R1),
when choosing {R1}. Instead, type L entrepreneurs get s(0,2)(A − RMT) and
p(A − R1), respectively. Good entrepreneurs will hence choose {MT,2RMT}
and bad ones {R1} if
￿
A − RMT ≥ A − R1,
p(A − R1) ≥ s(0,2)(A − RMT).
(32)
The two incentive compatibility constraints are summarized by the expression
below:
RMT ≤ R1 ≤
[p − s(0,2)]A + s(0,2)RAT
p
. (33)
ML is designed as follows: the microlender sets R1 to maximize proﬁts of
bad single entrepreneurs on contract {R1}, subject to his participation con-
straint, to zero-proﬁt condition on contract {MT,2RMT}, to limited liability
and, ﬁnally, to (33). In symbols
max
RBT






RMT ≤ R1 ≤










p , states that output
A is big relatively to opportunity cost of capital ρ. Solution to program (34) is
then separating:
R∗





16With ML the microlender is able again to produce screening between good
and bad borrowers: the reasoning is as in the previous section. If these contracts
are selected, type H entrepreneurs end up with
A − R∗
MT = A − ρ (36)
and type L ones with
p(A − R∗
1) = pA − ρ. (37)
Notice that Assumption 2 implies pA > ρ: this signiﬁes that projects of
both types are socially proﬁtable because their expected output is higher than
the sum of reservation proﬁts. It also means that condition (25) cannot hold as
an equality, with the eﬀect that condition (29) rewrites as q(0,2)(A − R∗
AT) <
p(A − R∗
BT). The microlender obtains his reservation proﬁt:
2R∗
MT + 2pR∗
1 = 4ρ. (38)
8 Equilibrium
In this section we solve the static Bayesian game played by the entrepreneurs
at t = 3. We check whether the following four combinations of pure strategies
are determined by BE of the game: (TTTS), (TTST), (TTSS) and (TTTT),
where, for ease of exposition but with no loss of generality, the order of players
is supposed to be HHLL, i.e. the ﬁrst two players are type H and the last two
ones are type L.
Before proceeding, it is important to remark that uncertainty about play-
ers’ type does not play any role in determining players’ payoﬀ. Indeed, we
suppose that an entrepreneur has incomplete information only if she plays S.
Yet, in such a case just two lending schemes may be implemented, either ML
or IL, with the eﬀect that type τ entrepreneur when selecting S gets either
pτ (A − ρ/p) or pτ (A − ρ/pM), respectively, for any belief about the others’
type.
First consider (TTTS) and (TTST). When one of these two combinations
are played, the outcome of game is “one team (with two type H entrepreneurs)
is built and two (type L) entrepreneurs stay alone” (see Subsection 4.1). In
this case, entrepreneurs anticipate that ML will be implemented: each type
H (resp. L) ends up with A − ρ (resp. pA − ρ) (see Section 7). We check
whether these combinations are robust to deviations by any player. The only
deviation available for a type H is playing S, in which case she anticipates that
ML will be implemented and that R∗
1 = ρ/p is the repayment charged to single
entrepreneurs: H gets A − ρ/p which is strictly lower than A − ρ. We can
conclude that no proﬁtable deviations are available for type H. Focus now on
type L playing T at equilibrium. If she deviates, i.e. she plays S, again ML
is implemented so that she ends up with pA − ρ. If type L playing S deviates,
i.e. she plays T, then PTL is implemented and she ends up with pA − ρ (see
17Subsection 6.2). We can conclude that no strictly proﬁtable deviations are
available for type L: (TTTS) and (TTST) are determined by BE of the game.
We now take into account combination (TTSS) for which the outcome of
game is “one team (with two type H entrepreneurs) is built and two (type
L) entrepreneurs stay alone”, ML is implemented and each type H (resp. L)
obtains A − ρ (resp. pA − ρ). If any type H deviates by selecting S, then the
outcome of game is “all entrepreneurs stay alone” and IL will be implemented.
Type H ends up with A−ρ/pM which is strictly lower than A−ρ: no proﬁtable
deviations are available for type H. Similarly, if any type L deviates by playing
T, ML is still implemented and type L gets pA − ρ: no strictly proﬁtable
deviations are available for type L. Also (TTSS) is determined by BE.
Finally, consider combination (TTTT) for which the outcome of game is
“two teams are built”, PTL is implemented and each type H (resp. L) obtains
A−ρ (resp. pA−ρ). If any type H deviates by selecting S, the outcome of game
is “one team is built and two entrepreneurs stay alone”, ML is implemented
and type H obtains A − ρ/p which is strictly lower than A − ρ: no proﬁtable
deviations are available for type H. At the same time, if any type L deviates
by playing S, ML is implemented and type L gets pA−ρ: no strictly proﬁtable
deviations are available for type L. Also (TTTT) is determined by BE.12
Summing up, four combinations of pure strategies are determined by BE
of the game: (TTTS), (TTST), (TTSS) and (TTTT), where recall that the
order of players is supposed to be HHLL. We therefore can conclude that
the equilibrium outcomes of the game are: (i) one team with two type H
entrepreneurs is built and type L entrepreneurs stay alone; (ii) two teams are
built between peers. In both cases the microlender ends up with his reservation
proﬁt.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, two outcomes of the game played
by the entrepreneurs at t = 3 are determined by pure-strategy BE: (i) the two
good entrepreneurs choose to build a team by adopting mixed technology and they
repay with probability 1, while the bad ones stay alone and repay with probability
p < 1; (ii) both good entrepreneurs form a team which adopts technology A
and repays with probability 1, whereas both bad ones build a team by selecting
technology B and repay with probability p < 1. The microlender always gets his
reservation proﬁt.
Forming a team between good peers enables the microlender to implement
screening mechanisms (either ML or PTL). The deriving disclosure of infor-
mation makes the microlender able to reduce the repayment charged to type
H entrepreneurs. In such a case the bad entrepreneurs are no more cross-
subsidized by the good ones, thereby being indiﬀerent, under Assumption 1,
between staying alone or building a team with BT.
12It is possible to check the no other combination of actions can be supported by a pure-
strategy BE.
18Our results suggest that targeting teams with high degree of complemen-
tarity among tasks (i.e. teams that choose either AT or MT) is a good lending
strategy when no collateral is required, and, as it occurs in urban areas, net-
works of local information and social capital are weak. Such teams repay with
higher probability because each member has strong incentive to look for good
mates, so as to maximize the revenues.
Identifying teams that adopt AT (resp. BT, resp. MT) as cooperatives
(resp. associations, resp. pool of cooperatives and associations) enables us to
interpret the MAGs data on the basis of peer selection and screening mecha-
nisms. Indeed, the ﬁrst equilibrium outcome displays the situation described
by Table 1, where the set of cooperatives and associations, i.e. teams with
MT that count only good entrepreneurs, turns out to be less risky than single
entrepreneurs, who are type L, and allows the microlender to charge a lower
interest rate to the former. The second equilibrium outcome explains the data
contained in Table 2, where cooperatives, teams with AT that consist of good
entrepreneurs, are better clients than associations, teams with BT made by bad
entrepreneurs.
9 Conclusion
Poor local information networks and weak social sanctions in urban developed
areas make joint liability unable to guarantee high repayment rates to microlen-
ders. Yet, microcredit programmes in Western Europe report a good degree of
ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency, according to NEF and Viganò, even if the majority of
them requests no collateral.
This paper proposes an alternative microcredit instrument that, like joint
liability, is able to mitigate informational problems in microcredit markets, but
ﬁt the urban context, where social sanctions are too weak to serve the role of
collateral substitutes.
The analysis on loans granted by MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6
Reggio Emilia reveals that (i) teams (cooperatives and associations) repay more
often than individual entrepreneurs and, between teams, (ii) cooperatives are
less risky than associations. On this basis, we develop a model where two types
of wealthless entrepreneurs, who diﬀers in their ability of producing output,
decide, before applying for loans, whether (1) to perform singularly the project,
or (2) to build production teams. Loans consist of diﬀerent lending schemes a
microlender commits to implementing conditional on the entrepreneurs’ choice
between alternatives (1) or (2).
Two equilibrium scenarios arise: (i) only good entrepreneurs constitute
teams, whereas bad ones choose to stay alone; (ii) all entrepreneurs build teams,
but good ones self-select among peers and adopt a technology with higher de-
gree of complementarity among contributions of each member, while bad ones
constitute teams among them and employ a technology with a lower level of
complementarity.
19Our ﬁndings suggest that targeting teams with high degree of complemen-
tarity among tasks is a good lending strategy when no collateral is put up and
social capital is weak. If we interpret teams that adopt AT (resp. BT) as co-
operatives (resp. associations), then the data seem to conﬁrm that the MAGs
follow this strategy: they set aside almost half of the loans to cooperatives,
whereas only 33% is granted to associations and 18% to single entrepreneurs.
The above interpretation also permits us to give a possible explanation, based
on peer selection and screening mechanisms, of the evidence that, at least among
MAGs’ clients, teams, generally, and cooperatives, more speciﬁcally, are better
entrepreneurs.
While the joint liability practice emphasizes social liaisons among entrepreneurs
of the same group, our schemes attract persons who desire to work at the same
project: their links have mainly technological and pecuniary nature. We believe
that this aspect may overcome problems of poor informational networks and
weak social ties, thereby making such an instrument more suitable to the needs
of microlenders and entrepreneurs who populate urban areas.
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